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ISSUES ON APPEAL" 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
f general damages 
Arnica Mutual I n s u r a n c e Cc^panv 
( h e r e i n a f t e r " p l a i n t i f f " or Arnica" d i s p u t e s Ine s t a t e m e n t -^ f t h e 
c a s e as vjorrar.Rfi - n^ ^ - • &f - ^ i ^ ^ r -v i> ; -
S c n e t ' -* .• . e f e n d a n t s s t a t e m e n t *f : V* 
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•*•- r>& f o c o r i " K- i Q ." a .7jr> r s p r i i -% -\n > . i - -'ues 
p.* - ' :~r u : - \ L L r o^Dn-it- *.ne : c . ^ " A i n q 
l e c i i d t i u n o*~ r a c t s i - ier ;menteu - ^ r i * * • i s ~> — 
r e l e v a n t do ^ j - . ^ : e n a a n t : 
1. - i i i i i i i i i ; . . l i i L d t e j a c t i o n Apr i l .*> 1985, a g a i n s t 
defendant Carl F. Schettler. (R. 002) 
2. In this action plaintiff alleged fraud, 
misrepresentation, and breach of contract in connection with the 
defendant's submission of a fraudulent claim for a stolen vehicle 
under his policy with plaintiff. (See Amended Complaint, R. 
028-048) 
3. In response to plaintiff's claim, defendant brought a 
counterclaim based on theories of defamation, insurer bad faith, 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, conversion, negligence 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Amended 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, R. 051-058) 
4. In addition to his counterclaim defendant brought a 
third-party action against third-party defendants National 
Automobile Theft Bureau ("NATB") and an independent adjusting 
company, Black, Nichols & Guiver. (R. 051-058) 
5. The counterclaim and third-party action brought by 
defendant sought damages in excess of $700,000,000. (R. 051-058) 
6. After prolonged litigation including extensive 
discovery, the trial court eventually dismissed defendant's 
counterclaim and third-party complaint on October 31, 1986. Said 
order and judgment of dismissal was certified a final judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 
722-725) 
7. Defendant appealed from this final order and that 
matter is the subject of a prior and separate appeal still pending 
before the Utah Supreme Court, bearing Case No. 860621. (R. 
) 
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M«r oompe l l ing d i s c o v e r y -of oe^eoiLei 3 1 , 
;•efendant f a i 1 ed t o 
respond ifiCiudeo persona; sr. v:& and rederal tax returns, 
interrogatories which were unanswered, personal and business 
financial records, flooring agreements, correspondence, business 
reports, copies of tape recordings, personal and business net 
worth statements, balance sheets, and other documents as set forth 
in plaintiff's requests. (See R. 816-830) 
15. Defendant filed no memoranda or affidavits in 
opposition to the motion for sanctions or to justify his failure 
to comply with the court's order of December 31, 1986. (See 
Record) 
16. The trial court found defendant to be in violation of 
its order compelling discovery and that defendant had offered no 
justifiable excuse for its failure to respond to the discovery in 
violation of the court's order compelling such discovery. The 
court ordered defendant's answer to be stricken and his default 
entered as a sanction pursuant to Rule 37(b). (See Order of 
February 21, 1987; R. 878-79) 
17. After entry of defendant's default he filed a demand 
for jury trial on March 3, 1987. (R. 887) 
18. Plaintiff objected to the demand for jury trial and 
the court, after oral argument via telephone conference with 
counsel for plaintiff and defendant, ruled that defendant's demand 
for jury trial was denied and that pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the remaining issue of damages 
would be determined by submission of affidavits by both parties. 
(See Order of March 10, 1987; R. 1143-4) 
19. Plaintiff submitted its memorandum and supporting 
affi : ! i 
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appeal bringirg these 
to its own motion, poured over the present appeal to the Court of 
Appeals of the State of Utah for disposition. 
25. No stipulation, motion or order regarding 
consolidation of the instant appeal with either of the two other 
pending appeals filed by defendant in this matter exist. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In response to defendant's claims of errors committed by 
the trial court in its entry of the several orders and judgment 
from which he presently appeals, plaintiff submits that each such 
ruling by the trial court was proper and supported by the evidence 
before the trial court. 
First, the denial by the trial court of defendant's 
motion for summary judgment was the only correct ruling the trial 
court could make given the existence of genuine issues of fact 
precluding summary judgment in favor of defendant. 
The decision of the trial court in striking defendant's 
answer and in entering his default as a sanction pursuant to Rule 
37 U.R.C.P. was within the sound discretion of the trial court and 
in this matter no abuse was present given the clear language of 
the court's order compelling such discovery and defendant's 
refusal to comply with the court's order and his history of dis-
covery abuses in this matter. 
Once defendant's default was entered he was in no 
position to demand a jury trial on the issue of plaintiff's 
damages. The eventual ruling by the trial court in awarding 
general damages of $98,579.24 and punitive damages of $100,000 is 
amply supported by the extensive affidavits and supporting r 
the Utah Supreme Court 
evidence submitted by plaintiff and the lack of meaningful 
opposition to such evidence submitted by defendant. The trial 
court's judgment in assessing the amount <j>f damages to be awarded 
plaintiff was in accord with decisions of 
regarding punitive damages in the light off all the facts 
surrounding defendant's conduct giving ri^e to plaintiff's claims 
and during the conduct of the litigation, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FJACT EXISTED 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT, 
in this appeal is the 
for summary judgment. 
The first point raised as "error" 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion! 
On November 4, 1986, defendant moved for summary judgment to 
dismiss plaintiff's complaint which included claims for fraud, 
misrepresentation and breach of contract. 
On this issue the standard to be applied has long been 
held to be that where a genuine issue of fact exists, considering 
all the evidence most favorably to the party opposing summary 
judgment, summary judgment must be denied 
603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); Sandberg v. KleinL 
Bihlmaier v. Carson, 
, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 
1978); and Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah (2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 
(1967). As specifically stated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Bihlmaier, supra, the trial court is under a duty to view all 
evidence, admissions and inferences most favorably to the party 
opposing summary judgment. See 603 P.2d at 791-2. 
While defendant does not challenge the above standard as 
applicable to his motion for summary judgment he attempts to 
mislead this court by limiting its review to questions of "loss" 
or "theft". Even attempting to so restrict this court's review 
defendant misstates the law with regard to what constitutes an 
insured "loss" under an automobile policy insuring against a loss 
by "theft". 
Plaintiff will herein show that genuine issues of fact 
indeed existed precluding summary judgment and contrary to 
defendant's claim, a technical theft does not constitute an 
insured loss under his auto policy with plaintiff. 
First, it is beyond dispute that the existence of a 
genuine issue of fact in support of any of the causes of action 
asserted by plaintiff is sufficient to defeat his motion for 
summary judgment. In the present case the record is replete with 
evidence in support of plaintiff's claims that defendant committed 
fraud, misrepresentation or breached express and implied terms of 
his insurance policy contract when he submitted his claim for a 
"stolen" vehicle. The evidence established that the vehicle had 
actually been repossessed by the repair shop for unpaid services 
and work. Such evidence precluding summary judgment included: 
1. Testimony by the manager of the auto repair shop, Mr. 
Wayne Schoenfeld of Pioneer Dodge that subsequent to repossession 
and before submission of the "theft" claim by defendant, he 
received a call from defendant during which he advised defendant 
that he was in possession of defendant's (par. (Depo. of Wayne 
Schoenfeld, pp. 39-40, R. 1174) 
2. The investigating officer fr6m the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Department investigating the stolen vehicle report made 
by defendant specifically questioned defendant as to whether the 
vehicle could have been repossessed. The officer testified that 
defendant responded "no chance". (Criminal Trial Transcript, Day 
1, pp. 7-9) 
3. Additionally, although defendant continually denied 
he ever telephoned Pioneer Dodge to ask if they had repossessed 
his car, defendant's friend, M. K. Fadel, testified that defendant 
told him he had made such a phone call to Pioneer Dodge. 
(Depo. of M. K. Fadel, p. 25, R. 1175) 
4. It is furthermore undisputed in this matter that more 
than a month and a half transpired between the date defendant's 
vehicle was repossessed by Pioneer Dodge and his receipt of 
payment on his "stolen" vehicle claim from plaintiff. (Affidavit 
of Ron Rosenthal, R. 351-7) 
The above-recited facts, sufficiently demonstrate that 
the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for summary 
judgment because evidence was in the record supporting plaintiff's 
claims. 
Defendant, by dwelling on the claim that Pioneer Dodge 
had not perfected its lien interest in his automobile and 
therefore committed a technical theft when it repossessed, 
attempts to cloud and confuse the issues th$t were before the 
trial court and which bear on this appeal. Whether or not Pioneer 
Dodge had perfected its lien is immaterial to the claims of fraud, 
misrepresentation and breach of contract asserted by plaintiff. A 
jury could reasonably find that defendant withheld material 
information when he knowingly failed to advise his insurer that 
his vehicle was in possession, whether lawfully or not, of Pioneer 
Dodge. The withholding of such pertinent information could indeed 
be found by a reasonable jury to have constituted "fraud or 
misrepresentation" by defendant. It is in fact undisputed in this 
matter that Pioneer Dodge acted in pursuit of a good faith claim 
for unpaid repair bills. 
As such, the case authorities consistently hold that 
although a technical "theft" may have occurred, this does not 
constitute a "loss" under one's automobile theft coverage of his 
insurance policy. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not directly decided this 
issue. However, in P. E. Ashton Co. v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162, 
406 P.2d 306 (1965), the Utah Supreme Court plainly indicates that 
more than a technical theft is required to constitute a loss under 
an insurance policy. Defendant's use of this case in his brief in 
support of the proposition that "the meaning of theft within an 
insurance policy should be liberally construed" cannot be 
supported by the decision in Joyner. The Utah court expressly 
requires the absence of good faith justification or a claim of 
right to the property before such will constitute "theft" under an 
insurance policy. As the court stated: 
as used in the | as including 
In view of the foregoing policy, it seems 
more logical and equitable j:hat this court 
interpret the term "theft", 
instant policy of insurance! 
the wilful taking or appropriation of one's 
personal property by another, wrongfully and 
without justification, with the design to 
hold or make use of such property in 
violation of the rights of the owner. Id. 
at 308. I 
In a case factually indistinguishable from the present 
appeal the Seventh Circuit in Young-Peters on Construction, Inc. v. 
ir. 1967) , held that 
insured vehicle, due to 
vehicle by another, 
Potomac Insurance Co., 382 F.2d 400 (7th C 
although there was a technical theft of an 
a claimed, although erroneous, right to th 
there was not a "loss by theft" under the insurance policy 
afforded by defendant. 
In Young-Peterson Construction, the plaintiff's former 
president, Allen Young, signed title to four company tractors and 
trailers as security for loans made by Mr. Robert Holtman. At th 
time of conveyance of title Mr. Young's employment with plaintiff 
had expired. Upon default on the loans by plaintiff, Holtman 
sought to take possession of the vehicles 
attorney, advised Holtman that the conveyance of title by Mr. 
Young was void due to his prior termination 
Plaintiff, through its 
as president of the 
company. Holtman nonetheless took possession and transported the 
vehicles out of state for sale. Plaintiff then submitted the 
theft claim under its policy with Potomac Insurance. On this 
issue the Seventh Circuit Court held: 
Consequently, we are not here concerned with 
what actual and legal rights or obligations 
were created between plaintiff and Holtman 
by the transactions involved [likewise this 
court is not concerned with the rights and 
obligations between Pioneer Dodge and 
defendant Carl SchettlerJ. 
We are, however, of the opinion that 
there is evidence from which the jury could 
have reasonably concluded that Holtman's 
taking of the truck tractors and trailers 
was in a good faith exercise of a claim of 
right . . . The taking was therefore not 
within the "loss by theft" coverage afforded 
by the policy issued by the defendant. Id. 
at 403. (emphasis added) 
Similarly, in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Switzer, 
257 Ark. 810, 520 S.W.2d 245 (1975), the Arkansas Supreme Court 
overruled the trial court's finding of an insured loss under an 
automobile theft coverage policy where the insured knew, or had 
reason to know, of the location of the vehicle and that the person 
in possession asserted a claim to the vehicle. Additional 
authorities holding in accord with these decisions include: South 
Carolina Insurance Co. v. Jackson, 103 Ga.App. 3, 117 S.W.2d 878 
(1961); Bigus v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 145 Mo.App. 170, 129 
S.W. 982 (1910); Rush v. Boston Insurance Co., 88 Misc. 48, 150 
N.Y.S. 457 (1914); Bowling v. Hamblen County Motor Co., 167 
Tenn.App. 52, 66 S.W.2d 229 (1932). 
As the court in Young-Peterson Construction, Inc. v. 
Potomac Insurance Co., supra, noted, "We are not here concerned 
with what actual and legal rights or obligations were created" 
between Pioneer Dodge and defendant. What is important is that 
there was evidence in the record which supported plaintiff's 
theories that defendant knew or had reason to know of the 
whereabouts of his car at the time he submitted his "stolen" 
vehicle report to plaintiff. As such whether or not there have 
been a technical "theft" is immaterial. Since defendant's failure 
to inform his insurer of the known whereabouts of the car 
constituted a withholding of material information. Since such 
evidence was replete in the record, the trial court correctly 
denied defendant's motion for summary judgment which would have 
dismissed plaintiff's complaint on all thepries 
POINT II. 
NO ERROR EXISTED IN STRIKING DEFENDANT'S 
ANSWER AND ENTERING HIS DEFAULT. 
The second alleged error by defendant relates to the 
decision by the trial court to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 
37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Defendant hopes to restrict the court's review of the 
facts that lead the trial court to impose sanctions. He argues 
that the only basis for the sanction was hi 
personal tax returns. However, the scope q 
for discovery rules and violation of express court orders 
compelling discovery is much broader. The 
December 31, 1986 stated: 
s failure to produce 
f defendant's disregard 
trial court's order of 
defendant's 
laintiff's 
Furthermore, with a denial ofl 
motion for summary judgment pfl 
motion to compel production or documents is 
granted, defendant having twolweeks from the 
date hereof to fully and completely respond 
to plaintiff's request for documents dated 
March 18 and March 27 of 1986. (emphasis 
added) (R. 803-4) 
It is undisputed that nothing further was done by 
defendant subsequent to the court's order in attempt to comply 
therewith. No further documents were provided, no further answers 
to interrogatories were given and no affidavits were filed 
explaining the reasons, if any, why discovery could not be 
provided. In effect, there was a total disregard of the court's 
order. 
As a result of defendant's blatant disregard for the 
trial court's order, sanctions were deemed appropriate pursuant to 
Rule 37(b). This conduct alone would have warranted the court's 
sanctions. However, at that point in the proceedings the trial 
court had before it a history of repeated discovery abuses and 
conduct of the most outrageous nature by defendant and his 
counsel. 
This conduct by defendant and his counsel were the 
subject of an earlier motion for sanctions which was heard in 
connection with plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in August, 
1986. (See R. 340-341 and as more particularly detailed in the 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, R. 360-382) Particular 
instances of misconduct during litigation included: 
1. A threat by defendant Carl Schettler against 
witnesses Ruel Ware and Dorothy Ware during their depositions of 
February 13, 1986. (See Affidavit of Court Reporter, Lynne L. 
Schinderling, R. 462-5) 
ons of Mr. and Mrs, 
s counsel spoke by 
2. Mr. Wayne Schoenfeld, former manager of Pioneer 
Dodge, Inc., testified that three or four weeks before his 
deposition he was approached by defendant s attorney, Mr. Edward 
Flint, who misrepresented himself as counsel for an insurance 
company. (See Deposition of Wayne Schoenfeld, pp. 102-3, R. 1174) 
3. Before the scheduled deposit: 
Steven Smith in Tampa, Florida, defendant1 
phone with Mr. and Mrs. Smith and told th^m that if they consented 
to give their deposition in Florida, he would subpoena them and 
they would be compelled to come to Utah to appear at the trial. 
As a result of these intimidating misrepresentations as to 
subpoena power, the Smiths initially declined to give their 
depositions. (See Depositions of Jill Smith, pp. 29-33, R. 1148; 
see also Deposition of Steve Smith, p. 33-
4. Finally, and most egregious, there was testimony from 
an independent witness, Mr. Troy Murdock, Iphat in April, 1986, 
shortly before he was to give a deposition 
picked up by defendant and his attorney and two other large 
gentlemen, taken to a notary and coerced into signing a false 
B5; R. 1149) 
in this matter, he was 
affidavit. The witness also testified that} 
by defendant in exchange for not appearing 
(See Transcript of Hearing before Judge Dean Conder on April 14, 
he was offered $1,000 
for his deposition. 
1986, R. 1677-1701; and Deposition of Troy 
As a result of this conduct by def 
plaintiff brought its earlier motion to str 
appropriate sanction which was still under 
Murdock, R. 1161) 
endant and his counsel, 
ike pleadings as an 
consideration by the 
trial court at the time of its ruling on plaintiff1s second motion 
for sanctions in February, 1987. (R. 722-5) Hence, the trial 
court had before it serious and repeated attempts by defendant and 
his counsel to impede justice, suppress evidence and fabricate 
false testimony through improper influence of witnesses. Given 
this entire history which defendant carefully avoids in his brief, 
it is understandable and commendable that the trial court would 
impose the most severe sanctions authorized by Rule 37(b). 
In W. W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West village, 
Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
default as a sanction is appropriate where the failure to respond 
to discovery impedes the trial or frustrates the purposes of 
justice and the determination of the validity of a defendant's 
claims: 
The sanction of default is justified where 
there has been a frustration of the judicial 
process, viz, where the failure to respond 
to discovery impedes trial on the merits and 
makes them possible to ascertain whether the 
allegations of the answer have any factual 
merit, Id. at 738. 
In the present case defendant's misconduct is far more 
serious than that of the defendant in w. W. & W. B. Gardner. Even 
disregarding defendant's attempt to coerce, intimidate and bribe 
witnesses he was in direct violation of the court's express order 
of December 31, 1986. In W. W. & W. B. Gardner, the defendant was 
not in violation of such an order yet the Supreme Court approved 
default as a sanction. Clearly the attempts by defendant to 
frustrate the civil trial process were severe. The record will 
also reflect the trial was approximately one month away at the 
time of the hearing on the motion for sanctions. (R. 801) 
state have seldom to deal 
involved in the present 
Fortunately, the courts of this 
with the type of litigation misconduct as 
action. However, in a prior case also involving litigation 
misconduct by a defendant, the Utah Supreme Court in Synergetics 
v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), note 
the importance of parties to a lawsuit complying with the trial 
court's orders regarding discovery: 
Were this court to allow such flagrant 
disregard for properly constituted orders of 
the lower courts, any defendant could avoid 
his obligations simply by becoming 
incommunicado. Id. at 1112. 
Although the court in Synergetics was dealing with the 
defendant's repeated absence from the jurisdiction to avoid his 
deposition, the principle it announced applies equally in the 
present case. In Synergetics, as in the present case, the trial 
court imposed the sanction of defaulting tljie defendant in 
violation of express court orders. 
Finally, certain statements of factt and law contained in 
defendant's brief must be addressed. In attempting to overturn 
the lower court's ruling imposing sanctions 
both the law and the facts applicable to th 
defendant cites W. W. & W. B. Gardner, suprl 
, defendant misstates 
is action. First, 
la, for the proposition 
that willful disobedience to a court order 
sanctions. However, this is a misstatement 
in that case. As stated at page 7 38 of the 
|is a prerequisite to 
of the direct holding 
decision: "Under Rule 
37(b) sanctions are justified without reference to whether the 
unexcused failure to make the discovery was willful." (emphasis 
added) 
Second, defendant makes a blatant misstatement of the 
facts in claiming he had given full access to his financial 
records and other requested documents prior to the hearing on the 
motion for sanctions. This simply is untrue. Defendant cannot 
support this claim by reference to the record because the record 
will reveal that no such access had been given. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
JURY DEMAND SUBSEQUENT TO ENTRY OF HIS 
DEFAULT. 
The third alleged error was the ruling by the trial court 
that defendant was not entitled to a jury trial in determining the 
amount of damages to be awarded plaintiff subsequent to striking 
defendant's answer and entering his default. 
The trial court clearly ruled pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in making this decision in 
its order of March 10, 1987. (R. 1143-4) That rule states: 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be 
entered as follows: 
. . . 
(2) By the Court. In all other cases 
the party entitled to a judgment by default 
shall apply to the court therefore. If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment 
or to carry it into effect, it is necessary 
to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth 
of any averment by evidence or to make an 
investigation of any other matter, the court 
may conduct such hearings or order such 
references as it deems necessary and proper. 
Defendant's argument that despite the entry of his default he is 
entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages is simply without 
merit. The procedure employed by the court in the present case 
was also adopted by the trial court in Synergetics v. Marathon 
Ranching Co., Ltd., supra. There the Utatj Supreme Court expressly 
approved the procedure of determining the (amount of damages fol-
lowing default by submission of appropriate affidavits by both 
parties. As the court summarily held: 
Defendants finally argue thalt the district 
court erred in assessing damages against 
defendants without a hearing. This 
contention is without merit. Id. at 1112. 
(emphasis added) 
In the present case defendant availed himself of the 
opportunity provided by the trial court and filed his own 
memorandum and affidavit. He did not object to the affidavits 
filed by plaintiff nor move to strike. (R| 1196-8) 
Permitting defendant to submit counteraffidavits on the 
question of damages was the most the trial court was obligated to 
do. Indeed, once a party is in default, whether pursuant to 
sanctions under Rule 37 or otherwise, the courts recognize a party 
lacks standing and is incompetent to compel] further proceedings 
before the court. Such is the purpose of tlhe entry of a default 
to eliminate one's personam standi in judic io. This was 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in a d ivorce action, Heath 
v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (1975): 
Defendant also contends that the trial 
court, in order to get around a 90-day 
period, it must have ordered a hearing and 
given the defendant notice thereof. This 
may have been so if defendant timely had 
filed an answer, but not where he was in 
default, in which event he is not entitled 
to either a hearing or notice. Id. at 1041. 
(emphasis added) 
Also, in Zweifel v. State Ex Rel. Brimmer, 517 P.2d 493 
(Wyo. 1974), the Wyoming court in dealing with the entry of 
defendant's default as a sanction cited with approval the 
following language from 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & 
Procedure, §2688, p. 282: 
Once the default is established defendant 
has no further standing to contest the 
factual allegations of plaintiff's claim for 
relief. Id. at 499. 
Accordingly, under the prevailing rule among 
jurisdictions and specifically approved by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Synergetics, defendant in this matter had no further standing 
to demand a jury and the submission of the issue of damages to the 
court upon the filing of affidavits was proper. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF GENERAL DAMAGES 
WAS PROPER AND SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Defendant next claims error by alleging that the trial 
court's award of general damages was unsupported by the evidence 
and the trial court failed to make necessary findings in its award 
of $98,579.24 as general damages. This contention is also 
groundless. 
After striking defendant's answelr and entering his 
default, the trial court permitted both parties to submit 
affidavits on the issue of damages. After due consideration c 
over 200 pages of memos, receipts, statements and other 
documentations in support of general damages, the trial court 
issued its memorandum decision in part finding: 
The court has carefully considered the file, 
the memorandum in support off damages award, 
and memorandum in opposition thereto, and is 
of the opinion that both general and 
punitive damages should be awarded in this 
matter. Damages are therefore awarded in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant in the sum of $98, 
damages to compensate the pi 
sums actually lost due to de1 
conduct, . . . (R. 1210) 
579.24 as actual 
laintiff for the 
If end ant ' s 
ision the trial court Subsequent to this memorandum dec 
made the following findings in its Finding^ of Fact and Judgment 
of May 6, 1987. (R. 1223-1225): 
general damages 
favor of 
The court further finds that 
are reasonable and proper in 
plaintiff and against defendant in the 
amount of $98,579.24 to compensate plaintiff 
for sums actually lost due to defendant's 
fraud and other misconduct. 
As stated above, these express findings by the court with 
regard to general damages were amply supported by extensive 
affidavits and supporting documents includir 
and other out-of-pocket expenses incurred by defendant as detailed 
in the affidavits of Henry E. Heath, Attorney, Robert Wallace, 
Attorney, and Ronald G. Rosenthal. Defendant's contention that 
the award of general damages is unsupported is simply without 
ng receipts, billings 
i 
merit. 
Furthermore, where a case supports an award of punitive 
damages, courts of Utah and other states have long recognized that 
a separate award of attorney's fees is also appropriate. This was 
tacitly acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court in Dahl v. Prince, 
230 P.2d 328 (Utah 1951), where the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
attorney's fees could be awarded where there was statutory 
provision, contract authorizing counsel fees or an award of 
punitive damages. (See Dahl v. Prince, supra, at p. 329) 
This principle was again announced by the Utah Supreme 
Court in DeBry & Hilton Travel v. Capital International Airways, 
583 P.2d 1181 (1978). The court there held: 
Counsel fees, in matters such as the one at 
hand [breach of contract action] can be 
considered as an element of damages only in 
those cases in which exemplary damages are 
or can be awarded. Idk at 1185. 
As in DeBry, the present action included a breach of 
contract theory in addition to fraud and misrepresentation. In 
both its memorandum decision and its findings of fact the trial 
court expressly found that punitive damages were both appropriate 
and necessary. (See R. 1222-5) Therefore, under the standards 
set forth, counsel fees were appropriately awarded. 
The trial court's award of attorneys' fees as an element 
of general damages is further supported by pertinent Utah 
statutory law. Defendant was originally charged and tried for 
criminal insurance fraud. Utah Code Annot. §76-6-521 (1953) 
provides that any person who presents a fraudulent insurance claim 
is punishable "as in the manner prescribe' for theft of property 
in excess of $1,000 is 
ih Code Annot. 
of like value." Theft of property valued 
punishable as a second degree felony. Ut 
§76-6-412(1)(a)(i) (1953). The insurance claim submitted by 
defendant was well in excess of $6,000. in addition, under Utah 
law any person who has been the victim of a theft by the 
presentment of a fraudulent insurance claim, "may bring an action 
. . . for three times the amount of actual damages . . . costs of 
suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. Utah Code Annot. 
|ed upon the foregoing 
al court did not err in 
general damages in the 
§76-6-412(2) (1953) (emphasis added). Bas| 
statutory scheme, it is clear that the tri 
awarding attorneys' fees as an element of 
instant case. 
Finally, it has long been recognifeed that where a claim 
for fraud is established, attorneys' fees may be awarded. See 
Wedig v. Brinster, 1 Conn.App. 123, 46 9 A.^d 783 (1983); Schlein 
v. Smith, 160 F.2d 22 (App.D.C. 1947). 
POINT V. 
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE] 
AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF 
TRIAL COURT IN 
$100,000. 
The final alleged error by defendant was the trial 
court's award of $100,000 as punitive damages. Again, defendant 
blindly asserts that this determination was unsupported by the 
record and that the court did not make the necessary findings 
Defendant also claims that the award was excessive in light of the 
"actual damages" 
Taking these allegations seriatum, it will be shown that 
(a) the court made express findings of fact on the issue of 
punitive damages, (b) the court's findings were supported by 
evidence in the record and (c) the award was proper in light of 
the facts and circumstances and standards set forth by decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
A. The Court Entered Findings of Fact With Regard to 
Punitive Damages. 
In the court's memorandum decision of April 23, 1987, the 
trial court specifically found as follows: 
The court has carefully considered the file, 
the memorandum in support of damages award, 
and the memorandum in opposition thereto, 
and is of the opinion that both general and 
punitive damages should be awarded in this 
matter. Damages are therefore awarded in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant in the sum of . . ., and the 
separate award of $100,000 as punitive 
damages as based upon the actions of the 
defendant herein. 
The court does not lightly award the 
damages set forth above, but has stated 
carefully, and at length considered the 
voluminous file and all of the various turns 
and twists that this case has taken. The 
court is of the opinion that the defendant 
committed fraud as alleged in plaintiff's 
complaint, and thereafter in the defense of 
the instant action engaged in activities 
both individually and through counsel which 
are reprehensible, inexcusable and which 
warrant both general damages and punitive 
damages as a clear warning to others that 
such behavior will not be tolerated by 
society. The court would not feel as 
strongly about this matter as it does were 
it not convinced that the actions have been 
of a very dangerous nature, with complete 
disregard for the rights ofl others, and 
designed in its ultimate end purpose to 
influence improperly the decision of this 
court. 
(See R. 1210-1211) 
Subsequently, the court entered |ts Findings of Fact and 
Judgment of May 6, 1987 finding in part: 
Defendant, Carl F. Schettler, committed 
fraud as alleged in plaintiff's complaint 
and such facts as otherwise 
plaintiff's complaint are e^ 
reason of the court's prior 
defendant's answer and enter! 
2. The court further finds that 
pled in 
tablished by 
order striking 
ing his default, 
iating this 
bf this case 
ndividually and 
subsequent to plaintiff initj: 
action defendant in defense 
engaged in activities both ik 
through counsel which the court finds are 
reprehensible, inexcusable and of sufficient 
gravity to warrant both general and punitive 
damages as a warning to defendant and others 
that such behavior would not 
by society. 
be tolerated 
5. The court further finds that 
punitive damages are reasonable and proper 
given the conduct of defendant in the amount 
of $100,000. 
Obviously, the claim that the court failed to make 
appropriate findings simply cannot stand. 
B. The Court's Findings With Red 
Were Supported by the Evidenq 
ard to Punitive Damages 
e. 
In addition to the facts in the record as discussed under 
Point II, supra, regarding litigation and misconduct by defendant 
and his attorney, the court also had before it an established 
claim of fraud and misrepresentation againsj: defendant. This by 
virtue of the entry of defendant's default.) Thus, all allegations 
as contained in plaintiff's complaint were deemed established. 
Additionally, the record included documentation of 
defendant's net worth in the form of personal financial statements 
that showed an average net worth for the years 1981 through 1986 
of $1,399,080. (R. 958-981) 
Defendant's most recent personal financial statement 
dated May 22, 1986 revealed personal net worth of $1,493,400. 
Defendant in his deposition admitted that his net worth had 
changed little from that time. (See R. 958-60 and Deposition of 
Carl Schettler of February 27, 1987, pp. 18-31, R. 983-996) 
Punitive damages high enough to constitute a strong 
warning to defendant and others were also warranted by defendant's 
threats of retribution against plaintiff. In his deposition 
defendant admitted to making such statements to Mr. Ronald 
Rosenthal, E*ranch Manager for Arnica Mutual Insurance. Defendant 
stated: 
Q. At any time during that conversation did 
you make the statement to Mr. Rosenthal that 
you would seek some type of retribution 
against Arnica and that you would some day 
own Arnica Insurance --
A. Not at that time, no. 
Q. When did you make such a statement? 
A. A statement similar to that was made to 
Mr. Rosenthal at the time of the preliminary 
hearing, I believe. 
Q. Do you recall what words you used? 
A. No. 
Q. Were they substantially! similar to the 
words that some day you wou|ld own Arnica 
Insurance? 
A- Not exactly that, but that they would 
suffer the consequences of their error. 
That was made clear to them. 
Q. How would they suffer the consequences? 
A. Monetarily. That's the only way they 
can suffer the consequences (Deposition of 
Carl F. Schettler, pp. 103-104) 
The above facts as well as those set forth under Point 
II, above, constitute only a portion of the record before the 
trial court in its determination of puniti 
misconduct of pre-trial litigation and the| 
difficulties in dealing with such a party 
recognized as influencing the amount of exemplary damages 
held in Synergetics, supra: 
Thus, this Court must look at the award 
ve damages. A party's 
trial court's 
lis another factor 
As 
[punitive damages], keeping in mind the 
attempted frustration of the judicial 
process by defendants which Resulted in the 
default judgment in the first place. Id. at 
1113. (emphasis added) 
This is the same situation presented in the instant 
appeal. The court in Synergetics, although dealing with much less 
serious misconduct, held: 
Given the circumstances of thle case, the 
award appears eminently reasonable, 
Therefore, the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding punitive damages 
in the amount of $200,000. Id. at 1113. 
The entirety of the record demonstrated by the above sampling of 
facts shows the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fixing 
punitive damages at $100,000. 
C. The Award of Punitive Damages is Not Excessive in 
Light of the Entirety of the Record and Given 
Guidelines Pronounced by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Defendant does not argue that punitive damages were 
inappropriate but merely attacks the amount fixed by the trial 
court. The Utah Supreme Court in First Security Bank of Utah v. 
J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591 (1982), discussed the factors to be 
considered in fixing the amount of punitive damages: 
In determining the amount of such damages, 
the factfinder should consider the following 
factors: The nature of the alleged 
misconduct of the defendant, the extent of 
the effect of the misconduct on the lives of 
the plaintiff and others, the probability of 
future reoccurrence of such conduct, the 
relationship between the parties, the 
relative wealth of the defendant, the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the misconduct 
and the amount of actual damages awarded. 
653 P.2d 598-9. (emphasis added) 
Defendant, in his brief, mentions only the amount of 
alleged "actual damages" in arguing that the punitive damages were 
excessive. However, assuming arguendo defendant's claimed amount 
of actual damages is correct, it is only one of the factors 
identified in First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards that bears 
on the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. In the instant 
appeal, the following factors must also be considered: 
1. By virtue of his default, the allegations of fraud 
and misrepresentation in plaintiff's complaint were deemed 
confessed. Hence, it was established that defendant had knowingly 
and fraudulently submitted his claim under his policy and 
plaintiff relied on his false representations to its detriment. 
2. During litigation of this matter defendant personally 
and through counsel attempted to threaten intimidate and coerce 
witnesses (see Record citations under Point II above) 
3- Defendant personally threatened plaintiff's Branch 
Manager in retaliation for cooperation with law enforcement 
officers investigating criminal charges against defendant. 
4. The filing of a counterclaim |by defendant against 
plaintiff alleging seven causes of action |and seeking damages in 
excess of $700,000,000. 
5. Deliberate disregard by defendant of court orders 
expressly compelling discovery 
Given these factors and others, it cannot be said that 
the trial court clearly abused its discretion in awarding punitive 
damages of $100,000. Rather, given the outrageous nature of 
defendant's conduct as established by the confessed pleadings and 
his conduct of the litigation, the amount oJ 
awarded is a proper punishment to defendant: 
f punitive damages 
and others who would 
engage in similar conduct. As stated by the trial court judge: 
The court does not lightly award the damages 
set forth above, but has stated carefully, 
and at length considered the voluminous file 
and all the various turns and twists that 
this case has taken. The court is of the 
opinion that the defendant committed fraud 
as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, and 
thereafter in the defense of the instant 
action engaged in activities both 
individually and through counsel which are 
reprehensible, inexcusable and which warrant 
both general damages and punitive damages as 
a clear warning to others that such behavior 
will not be tolerated by society* The court 
would not feel as strongly about this matter 
as it does if it were not convinced that the 
actions have been of a very dangerous 
nature, with complete disregard for the 
rights of others, and designed in his ultimate 
end purpose to influence improperly the 
decision of this court, (R. 1211) 
The above language from the court's memorandum decision reflects 
its involvement and perception of the multitude of factors which 
led up to its award of punitive damages. The trial court was best 
positioned to make such a determination. Although punitive 
damages are to be sparingly awarded, the trial court was 
convinced, as reflected by the above language, that such damages 
were absolutely necessary given defendant's conduct. This court 
should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on 
this matter. The award fixed by the trial court should stand for 
the reasons the trial court itself pronounced. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has herein shown that the claimed errors by 
defendant in the court's various rulings are without merit. 
In considering defendant's motion for summary judgment 
the trial court properly refused to dismiss plaintiff's complaint 
as there were genuine issues of fact in the record which supported 
plaintiff's claims for relief. Defendant's argument that there 
could be no claim of fraud or misrepresentations since there had 
in fact been a "theft" of his automobile fails because defendant's 
flagrant withholding of information from plaintiff and law 
enforcement officers investigating his stolen vehicle report 
constituted a withholding of material information as to the car's 
location and precluded a thorough investigation by plaintiff. 
Defendant's claim that the trial|court erred in imposing 
the sanction of entry of his default for failure to produce 
discovery fails because it has been shown 
acted within its sound discretion as permitted by Rule 37(b) 
that the trial court 
especially where it had previously ordered production of the 
entered by the court, 
discovery which order went unheeded by defendant. This violation 
of a court order was but one instance in aj pattern of discovery 
abuse, intimidation and litigation misconduct by defendant and his 
counsel. 
Once defendant's default had beenl 
he was in no position to demand a jury trial on the issue of 
damages. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of a jury trial on 
the issue of damages was not error but purs 
expressly approved in Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching, Ltd., 
supra. 
uant to procedures 
Finally, with regard to the amount 
punitive damages determined by the trial court, defendant has 
of general and 
the contrary, it has 
pursuant to express 
ted in the form of 
failed to show how error was committed. On 
been shown herein that the awards were made 
findings amply supported by evidence submit] 
affidavits and otherwise. Defendant's argument that punitive 
damages in particular were excessive given the amount of "actual 
damages" is erroneous because it falsely assumes the amount of 
actual damages and furthermore fails to consider the other factors 
present before the court which it was also obligated to take into 
account in its determination. 
For these reasons plaintiff respectfully prays that this 
Honorable Court affirm the various rulings by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this 7 ~ day of December, 1987. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Baird Morgajaf / 
Attorneys for/plaintiff 
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